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RESTORING RESPECT FOR THE LAW
IN CANADA-U.S. COMMERCE: THE
REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL

So FAR
By: ChristopherSands'
If you have ten thousand regulations, you destroy all respect for
the law.
-Winston

Churchill

Anecdotes concerning ludicrous regulation are almost as common
in democratic societies as complaints about taxes and poor public
services. While the average voter accepts the need for regulation in
principle, the proliferation of regulation in modern society has
gradually reduced respect for the role of government in regulating
economic activity. Particularly in the United States, concern over the
size and cost of government has put pressure on regulators to focus on
economic impacts, cost-benefit analyses, and competing claims about
the public good.'
Regulation has particularly become a growing issue in
international trade, with regulatory compliance in multiple
jurisdictions adding to costs (and consumer prices), and occasionally
limiting or prohibiting market access for certain products or
personnel.' In 2011, the United States and Canada embarked on their
latest effort in a series of negotiations aimed at limiting the negative
impact of regulatory differences on bilateral trade and the economic
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1.

See generally Jodi L. Short, The Paranoid Style in Regulatory Reform,
63 HASTINGS L.J. 633 (2012).

2.

See, e.g., Richard Blackwell, Border Deal Aims to Reduce Tyranny of
Small Differences in Regulation, GLOBE & MAIL (Sep. 6, 2012),
http://m.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy/borderdeal-aims-to-reduce-tyranny-of-small-differences-in-regulation/article
4085386/?service=mobile.
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competitiveness of firms operating in either country.' This paper looks
at the context for these talks, their structure, and some of the
challenges that will be faced.
PROTECTIONISM'S RESORT TO REGULATION

International trade was badly damaged by the wave of
protectionism that coincided with (and exacerbated) the Great
Depression.' The United States Congress adopted the Smoot-Hawley
tariff in 1930, which raised tariff rates in the United States and
prompted other countries to retaliate.5 This essentially closed the
United States to trade for several years following.' The passage of the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 not only rescinded the
Smoot-Hawley tariff rates, but also limited American protectionist
measures to just two relatively minor tools: anti-dumping duties (used
when another country or a foreign company "dumps" products into
the United States market at prices below the cost of production, just
to gain a foothold in the market at the expense of other producers)
and countervailing duties (a tariff applied provisionally to counter the
effect of a foreign subsidy or unfair trade practice).' These two
emergency trade measures were retained just in case foreign trade
partners attempted to take advantage of the renewed openness of the
United States.' This domestic reform was reinforced by the launch of
international negotiations under the aegis of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT")' in 1947 in an effort to promote
3.

UNITED STATES-CANADA REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL: JOINT
ACTION PLAN (2011) [hereinafter RCC ACTION PLAN), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/us-canada-rccjoint
action plan3.pdf.

4.

See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen & Douglas A. Irwin, Trade Blocs, Currency
Blocs and the Reorientation of World Trade in the 1930s, 38 J. INT'L
EcoN. 1, 2 (1995).

5.

See id.; see also Robert B. Archibald & David H. Feldman, Investment
During the Great Depression: Uncertainty and the Role of the SmootHawley Tariff, 64 So. ECON. J. 857, 860-61 (1998).

6.

See generally Eichengreen & Irwin, supra note 4, at 6-7.

7.

See generally Claude Schwob, Did the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
of 1934 Initiate a Revolution in the American Trace Policy?, 34 HIST.
Soc. RES. 377 (2009); see also Abraham Berglund, The Reciprocal
Trade Agreements Act of 1934, 25 AM. ECON. REv. 411 (1935).

8.

See, e.g., Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Protection Against International Price
Discrimination: United States Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties,
58 COLUM. L. REv. 44, 53 (1958).

9.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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international trade disarmament and further the global retreat from
trade protectionism."'
Within the decade, anti-dumping and countervailing duties were
sought by a growing number of American producers, and what had
been marginal instruments of trade protection for "emergencies"
became the mainstay of both American protectionism and
protectionism abroad." The lesson of this experience was that the
motivations for protectionism are strong and firms will seek to use
whatever means are available to gain an advantage (or to compensate
for a disadvantage) in their domestic market.
As the GATT negotiations, the Canada-United States Free Trade
Agreement ("CUFTA"),12 and the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA")" lowered tariff barriers affecting trade
between the United States and Canada, regulatory differences became
more significant as obstacles to market access for companies in both

countries. At the same time, regulations proliferated in both countries
became more significant in shaping each domestic marketplace.
RISE OF THE REGULATORY STATE

Progressivism as a political movement gained adherents and
influence in both the United States and Canada in the early part of
the twentieth century." Distinct from liberalism, progressivism
advocated meritocracy and government by experts as a counterweight
to corrupt patronage politics and electoral manipulation.' 5 This more
enlightened approach to government, progressives believed, would
help society to progress with improved living conditions for all,
through greater consumer safety, better working conditions, and rising
quality standards. 6

10.

See generally, e.g.,
Harold K. Jacobson, Beyond Economic
Disarmament, 16 POL. SCI. & POL. 1, 10-12 (1983) (discussing the nature
and purpose of the GATT and surrounding negotiations).

11.

See Ehrenhaft, supra note 8.

12.

Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 1, 1988, U.S.-Can.,
CAN. T.S. No. 3 (1989), 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).

13.

North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,
CAN. T.S. No. 2 (1994), 132 I.L.M. 289 (1993).

14.

See, e.g., William Schambra, Obama and the Policy Approach, NAT'L
AFF., Fall 2009, at 129-130, available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com
/doclib/20091229 Schambra _Fall09.pdf (discussing the roots of
progressivism in the United States and its export).

15.

See id. at 130-131.

16.

See generally id. at 130.
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The rise of progressivism coincided with the growth of the social
welfare state in the years following World War II, which saw the role
of government in the economy grow in both Canada and the United
States as a provider of income security, access to health care, and
public infrastructure. 7 Thus, as the state expanded its economic role,
it also expanded its regulatory role and the ranks of the civil service
were bolstered by credentialed experts.'" The number of regulatory
bodies and agencies in both countries multiplied, and the annual
number of pages in publications like the United States Federal
Register and the Canada Gazette surged. 9
The growth of regulation became a burden for domestic economic
activity as well as for cross-border commerce. Compliance costs with
numerous and often contradictory regulations implemented by federal
and also by state and provincial governments grew and became a drag
on North American competitiveness.20 Even though other countries
had followed a similar path in establishing social welfare programs
and regulation of market activity, the European Union ("EU"), for
example, also sought to harmonize regulation across the EU region,'
while the market growth in developing economies, such as China,
outpaced the capacity of regulation, resulting in a greater degree of
freedom for economic action.22 Despite the CUFTA and the NAFTA,
17.

See generally, e.g., ELIZABETH A. SEGAL, SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND
PROGRAMS: A VALUES PERSPECTIVE (2009) (discussing the history and

development of the social welfare state and related services).
18.

See, e.g., Schambra, supra note 14, at 130.

19.

See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Would the REINS Act Rein in Federal

Regulation? Congress Makes Another Effort to Regain Control of
Regulation, CATO INST.: REC. REFORM, Summer 2011, at 22-23, available

20.

at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv34n2/regv34n2-2.pdf (discussing the fact that, as the amount of regulatory activity in the United
States greatly increased post-WWII, the Federal Register grew from less
than 11,000 pages in 1950 to well over 80,000 pages today).
See generally, e.g., ROBERT W. CRANDALL & LEONARD WAVERMAN,
TALK IS CHEAP: THE PROMISE OF REGULATORY REFORM IN NORTH
AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
(1995)
(providing a history of

regulatory difficulties and the negative impact of associated costs in
several North American telecommunication industries).
21.

See, e.g., MICHAEL HART, C.D. HOWE INST., STEER OR, DRIFT? TAKING
CHARGE OF CANADA-US REGULATORY CONVERGENCE 9-13 (2006),

available at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_229.pdf
ussing the move for a "single market" program in the EU region).
22.

(disc-

See generally, e.g., WENDY DOBSON, C.D. HOWE INST., TAKING A
GIANT'S MEASURE: CANADA, NAFTA AND AN EMERGENT CHINA (2004),

available at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_202.pdf (discussing the rapid market growth in China over the last few decades and
the resulting increase in global trade and economic freedom).
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the goal of a single North American market for goods and services was
not realized due in part to regulatory mismatches. 23 Instead, the three
federal governments, along with thirty-one Mexican states, all fifty
states in the United States, all ten Canadian provinces, the three
Canadian territories, and many county and municipal jurisdictions,
sought to regulate cross-jurisdictional transactions with increasing
assertiveness. 24
REGULATORY REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES

Despite the incidence of regulatory overlap, the United States has
generally received high marks for its regulatory system, due to its
transparency, non-discrimination between domestic and foreign
entities, and the capacity of foreign interests to participate in
regulatory processes and reviews. 25 For this reason, the United States
has been able to attract foreign direct investment and to engage in
international trade with little or no tension with its foreign partners
concerning market regulation and access. 26
Rather, the principal initiative to reform regulation in the United
States has been domestic. During the second half of the twentiethcentury and continuing today, as the regulatory capacities and
interests of government have expanded, a movement of commercial
interests, nongovernmental activists, legal scholars, and academics,
has emerged to press for greater efficiency in market regulation; in
some cases, this has manifested as a call for less regulation, and in
others for regulations that do a more effective job at reducing risks to
the public.27
In his review of regulatory reform efforts from the Ford to Clinton
Administrations, Murray Weidenbaum noted that presidents of both
parties had mixed success in attempting to discipline the growth of

23.

See generally, e.g., HART, supra note 21, at 13-16 (discussing NAFTA
limitations due in part to regulatory impact).

24.

See, e.g., GARY ANDERSON & CHRISTOPHER SANDS, HUDSON INST.,
NEGOTIATING NORTH AMERICA: THE SECURITY AND PROSPERITY

PARTNERSHIP 5-7 (2007) (discussing several joint efforts to harmonize
regulation in North America leading up to the establishment of the

Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America in 2005).
25.

See generally, e.g.,
VERA
NICHOLAS-GERVAIS
ET AL.,
REGULATORY REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: ENHANCING
OPENNESS THROUGH REGULATORY REFORM (1999).

26.

See id. at 6-7.

27.

See, e.g., id. at 41 (indicating policy options for more effective
regulation with greater benefits to international trade and to the
public).
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federal regulation. 28 Presidents established review groups and
executive branch clearinghouses, and issued executive orders
mandating review of new regulations, cost-benefit analyses, and other
impact assessments, prior to the issuance of new regulations. 2 9 More
often than not, Weidenbaum notes that the source of regulatory
problems was statutory, that is, originating in congressional action
and not in an executive action."o While there had been an increased
awareness on the part of federal regulators regarding the compliance
costs of new regulations and some evidence of regulatory parsimony at
particular times and in particular agencies, Weidenbaum argues that
Congress drove an expanding regulatory state steadily forward in its
ambition and reach during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.1'
Jonathan Adler offers a different view, one in which Congress has
lost control of the regulatory process to the ambitions of executive
branch regulators:
Over the past several decades, the scope, reach, and cost of
federal regulations have increased dramatically. As the federal
regulatory state has grown, legislative control over regulatory
policy has declined. Long after authorizing legislation is
adopted, agencies continue to adopt regulations and implement
policies with relatively little legislative input or oversight. At
the same time, presidential administrations of both parties have
used administrative regulations to implement policies and
programs that Congress failed to approve. As legislative control
over regulatory policy has waned, so too has congressional
accountability for the regulation. 32
Whether Congress or the Executive Branch is to blame, domestic
regulatory reform efforts in the United States in recent decades have
had only a modest impact on the growth of regulation. As Jodi Short
noted in a recent article on this movement:
The promise of the late-twentieth-century regulatory reform
movement was a significantly deregulated polity in which the
regulators that remained would manage the risks of contemporary
society more efficiently and effectively, but four decades of regulatory

28.

See generally Murray Weidenbaum, Regulatory Process Reform: From
Ford to Clinton, REG., Winter 1997, available at http://heartland.org/
sites/all/modules/custom/heartland-migration/files/pdfs/5376.pdf.

29.

See id.

30.

See id.

31.

See id. at 25-26.

32.

Adler, supra note 19, at 22.
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reform have produced a society that is neither significantly less
regulated nor significantly less risky.'
However, domestic regulatory reform advocates in the United
States have gradually increased the stigma of regulation and the
growth of the government in voter perception.' Similar to the way in
which tax rates, fiscal deficits, and public debt began to be a cause for
concern among economists and scholars, then among conservative
politicians, and eventually became a consensus problem decried by
Republican and Democratic politicians alike, the costs of regulation
(and concern for over-regulation) have become more important to the
general public in the United States.35 This growing consensus is still
fragile, but suggests that a certain political momentum for continued
efforts at regulatory reform may exist.
So, just as President Bill Clinton declared in a State of the Union
Address that "the era of big government is over, 3 6 President Barack
Obama aligned himself with regulatory reformers in his 2011 State of
the Union Address, "To reduce barriers to growth and investment,
I've ordered a review of government regulations. When we find rules
3
that put an unnecessary burden on businesses, we will fix them.'"
President Obama acted on this pledge by issuing Executive Order
13563 in 2011, which remains in effect, mandating that his
administration consider the cost of compliance with new and existing
regulations, improve the transparency of the regulatory process, and
simplify rules and compliance whenever possible."
At the same time, Christopher DeMuth argues top-down
Executive Branch efforts at regulatory reform are consistent with a
recent trend toward centralization of power within the Executive
33.

Short, supra note 1, at 634.

34.

See, e.g., id. at 668, 679 (discussing "coercive-state anxiety" whenever
increased regulation is at stake).

35.

See generally, e.g., Edward Alden, The Costs (and Benefits) of
Government Regulations on Business, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Aug.
22, 2012), http://blogs.cfr.org/renewing-america/2012/08/22/the-costs(noting growing
and-benefits-of-government-regulations-on-business/
public concern over whether regulation is stifling the American
economy).

36.

President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan.
23, 1996), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/other/sotu.ht
ml.

37.

President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 2011),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/
remarks-president-state-union-address.

38.

See Exec. Order No. 13563 of January 18, 2011, Improving Regulation
and Regulatory Review, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-01-21/pdf/2011-1385.pdf.
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Branch that has reduced the effective role of Congress and the
judiciary, as well as that of the states, in competition with
presidential administrations, as constitutional "checks and balances"
that provide public accountability to regulatory activities." This is a
broad argument about the nature of American government that
conflicts the spirit of openness and accountability noted by the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD")
as a salient feature of regulation in the United States, as well as with
the ongoing efforts at regulatory reform that continue today.40
THE REGULATORY IMPACT OF THE SECURITY AND
PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP

This context is important to understand recent efforts made by
American administrations to advance the cause of regulatory reform
through engagement with American trading partners, most notably
with Canada and Mexico.
During the Clinton Administration, the United States began talks
on regulation with the federal governments of Canada and Mexico
through a set of trilateral working groups established in the NAFTA
to look at "harmonizing standards and eliminating differences in
regulation among the three governments and their agencies that,
while costly for businesses and consumers, could be reconciled without
harming public health or safety." 4 1 The NAFTA Working Groups had
a mixed record of success, many meeting only once or twice; the
controversy that surrounded the congressional ratification debate over
NAFTA gave regulators little sense of public (or political) support for
regulatory harmonization across North America.42
The George W. Bush Administration sought to re-energize talks
on regulation and inspection at the borders and within them. At a
March 2005 summit in Waco, Texas, with Canada's prime minister
and Mexico's president, Bush launched the trilateral Security and
Prosperity Partnership of North America ("SPP").4 3 The SPP was a
process of technical negotiations on economic and security rules and

39.

See Christopher DeMuth, Competition and the Constitution, NAT'L
AFF., Fall 2011, at 38-55, available at http://www.nationalaffairs.com/
doclib/20110919_DeMuth.pdf.

40.

See generally NICHOLAS-GERVAIS ET AL., supra note 25.

41.

ANDERSON & SANDS, supra note 24, at 5.

42.

See id. at 5, 11 & 1,5.

43.

SECURITY AND PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP OF NORTH AMERICA

(2005),

available at http://www.spp-psp.gc.ca/eic/site/spp-psp.nsf/eng/00057.ht
ml.
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regulations conducted by working-level counterparts in the
governments of the United States, Canada, and Mexico."
The design of the SPP was innovative, "eschewing the more
traditional diplomatic and trade negotiation models in favor of talks
among civil service professionals and subject matter experts within
each government."45 The design placed the negotiation fully within
the authority of the American Executive Branch to enforce and
execute the law and statutes, and follow to a certain extent the
nature of the subjects of the negotiation (regulatory approvals,
standards, and security procedures and requirements). 46
The Report to Leaders issued in June 2005 ("SPP Report to
Leaders") 47 identified more than three hundred separate irritants as
priorities for one or more of the three governments. These three
hundred items were assigned to a slightly more manageable set of
twenty working groups (ten on the prosperity side and ten for
security issues): 48
SPP Working Groups
Prosperity Agenda
E-Commerce
Energy
Environment
Financial Services
Food and Agriculture
Health
Manufactured
Goods
Competitiveness

and

Sectoral

and

Regional

Movement of Goods

44.

See generally id.

45.

ANDERSON & SANDS, supra note 24, at 5.

46.

See id.

47.

SECURITY AND PROSPERITY PARTNERSHIP OF NORTH AMERICA, REPORT
To LEADERS (2005) [hereinafter SPP REPORT TO LEADERS], available at

http://www.spp-psp.gc.ca/eic/site/spp-psp.nsf/vwapj/Report-RappportJu2005.pdf/$file/Report-Rappport-Ju2005.pdf.
48.

See
Working
Groups,
Gov'T
OF
CAN.,
http://www.spppsp.gc.ca/eic/site/spp-psp.nsf/eng/00020.html
(last visited Dec. 27,
2012); see also ANDERSON & SANDS, supra note 24, at 16.
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Transportation
Business Facilitation
Security Agenda
Aviation Security
Bio-protection
Border Facilitation
Cargo Security
Intelligence Cooperation
Law Enforcement Cooperation
Maritime Security and Transport
Critical Infrastructure Protection
Science and Technology Cooperation
Traveler Security
The SPP Report to Leaders then divided the items on the SPP
agenda into three basic categories: (1) "early harvest" items, often
referred to as "low-hanging fruit"; (2) nearer term "big impact"
initiatives that would take more time but yield a bigger benefit; and
(3) longer-term ideas and initiatives left on the table for discussion at
a future date. 49 The three categories each corresponded with target
completion dates at the request of the leaders, who insisted that the
SPP was to be an action-oriented initiative rather than a debating
society."
In the three-month period between Waco and the SPP Report to
Leaders, numerous "early harvest" objectives had already been
achieved. Included among them were progress on work toward
modernizing the NAFTA's temporary entry provisions for
professionals, the creation of a harmonized approach to the mad-cow
outbreak in North America, improvements to aviation safety and air
navigation systems, and work towards liberalizing the NAFTA's rules
of origin."' On security matters, progress had been made on
infrastructure concerns ranging from the Windsor-Detroit border
crossing, to Nogales, Arizona, to the identification of new sites for test
49.

See

50.

See id.

51.

See id.

ANDERSON & SANDS, supra note 24, at 16.
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programs like NEXUS Marine, and work towards adopting a common
trilateral position on standards in the World Customs Organization."2
While the "early harvest" items were not unimportant, they were not
uniformly a product of the new impetus given by the SPP, but reaped
what had been sown in previous bilateral and trilateral discussions,
processes, and initiatives.
Progress on the "big impact" and longer-term objectives was a
more significant task, especially within the deadlines ranging from as
little as six months to several years set in the SPP Report to the
Leaders.13 Anticipating this task, the cabinet-level group organized
these priorities into six baskets, three on the prosperity side and three
on the security side. The importance of the "big impact" or longer
term objectives to the fate of the SPP was recognized by referring to
these items as Signature Initiatives.5 4 The Signiature Initiatives were
as follows:
SPP Signature Initiatives
Prosperity
I. Making North America the Best Place to do Business
* Enhancing and Streamlining Regulatory Process in North
America
* Fake Free North America
* Expanding Duty Free Treatment by Liberalizing Rules of
Origin
II. Sectoral Collaboration
Competitiveness

to

Enhance

North

American

* Steel: A Strategic Partnership-A Strategic Industry
* Moving Towards a Fully Integrated Auto Sector
* Creating
America

a

Sustainable

Energy

Economy

for North

* Air Transportation: Expanding Our Horizons
* Safer, Faster and More Efficient Border Crossings
* Free and Secure Electronic Commerce
* Enabling Our People
52.

See id.

53.

See SPP

54.

See, e.g.,

REPORT TO LEADERS, supra note

47.

ANDERSON & SANDS, supra note 24, at 17.
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III. Making North America the Best Place to Live
* Clean Air, Clean Water:
Environment

Protecting People and Our

* Access to a Safe and Reliable Food Supply
* Healthier North America

Security
I. Securing North America From External Threats
* Biometrics and Secure Documentation Vision
* Real-Time Information Sharing
* Compatible Screening Standards
* Export Controls for Radioactive Sources
* Bioprotection
II. Preventing and Responding to Threats within North America
III. Further Streamlining the Secure Movement of Low-Risk
Traffic Across Our Shared Borders
One of the more interesting features of the SPP was the inclusion
of the private sector in the discussion through the creation of the
North American Competitiveness Council ("NACC") in March 2006.11
The NACC brought together thirty corporate representatives from
North America's largest companies." Having business at the table was
important because it created the potential to broaden the discussion
beyond a narrow focus on additional procedures and investment in
security hardware. While it would be nice to think that this opening
of the discussion to other perspectives was the work of the three
governments, the creation of the NACC was in fact the result of a
strong push by the United States Chamber of Commerce that led to
the Bush Administration agreeing that if business was able to

55.

See, e.g., N. AM. COMP. COUNCIL, ENHANCING COMPETITIVENESS IN
CANADA, MEXICO, AND THE UNITED STATES: PRIVATE SECTOR PRIORITIES
FOR THE SECURITY AND PROSPERJTY PARTNERSHIP OF NORTH AMERICA
NORTH
AMERICAN
OF
THE
(SPP)-INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS
COMPETITIVENESS COUNCIL (NACC) 3 (2007) [hereinafter NACC

RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://www.uschamber.com/sites/
default/files/reports/070223nacc.pdf.
56.

See id. at 58-59 (listing all thirty NACC participants).

330

CANADA-UNITED

STATES LAW JOURNAL - VOLUME

37.

2 - 2012

ISSUE

Restoring Respect for the Law in Canada-US Commerce

organize itself, then they would talk."7 So with the support of its
Canadian and Mexican counterparts, the Chamber of Commerce put
together a council." The NACC held a number of meetings, including
meeting privately with the three leaders, and made a number of
recommendations regarding greater economic integration within North
America.59 The various non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"),
which had not pushed as strongly for inclusion, were upset at being
excluded and responded with an ongoing chorus criticizing the overall
initiative."o
In August 2007, at the third summit of North American leaders in
Montebello, Quebec, President Bush, Prime Minister Harper and
President Calder6n responded to civil society critics and to the urging
of the NACC by issuing a statement on regulatory cooperation." The
Regulatory Cooperation Framework ("Montebello RCF") set forth the
following principles for regulatory changes,62 if any, by the three
federal governments without addressing specific regulations:
RCF Common Regulatory Principles
1. Justify the need for regulation, including the consideration of
market failures.
2. Identify alternatives to addressing
including non-regulatory options.

a regulatory

need,

3. Assess the costs and benefits of regulatory and, where
appropriate, non-regulatory alternatives so that options that
maximize net benefits can be identified.

57.

See ANDERSON & SANDS, supra note 24, at 21.

58.

See NACC RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 55, at 10-11.

59.

See generally id.

60.

These disaffected civil society groups came from all three countries and
included, inter alia, the Council of Canadians; Fathers for Justice
Canada; Stop the North American Union; the Minutemen Project; and
the Mexican Action Network on Free Trade. As noted, the SPP was an
innovative deviation from tradition trade negotiation models as it
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society in negotiations. Non-consultation and exclusion of NGOs from
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4. Minimize the adverse impact of regulation on a fair,
competitive and innovative market economy.
5. Minimize unnecessarily divergent or duplicative requirements
within North America.
6. Promote performance-based regulation where appropriate and
to the extent practicable.
7. Ensure timeliness in regulatory decision-making.
8. Write regulations in plain language so they are easily
understood.
9.
Ensure
transparent
regulatory
development
and
implementation, making regulations and regulatory impact
analyses easily accessible.
10. Evaluate and review existing regulations routinely.
The Montebello RCF itself was based on the OECD's Guiding
Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance ("OECD
Guidelines")' 3 which had already been endorsed by the three
governments." Whereas the "Prosperity" working groups of the SPP
were created to address the need to reform the existing "stock" of
regulations that were impeding regional competitiveness, the
Montebello RCF established principles for the "flow" of future
regulation. It emphasized process transparency and the principle of
fairness toward the regulated. As such, it was uncontroversial, but at
the same time the commitment of the leaders to these principles had
no discernable impact on regulatory practices within their respective
governments; at best, one of the governments could cite the
Montebello RCF in a dispute over a regulatory change that violated
these guidelines and insist that the breach of the commitment be
justified. Still, the innovation of the Montebello RCF was the attempt
to at least address future rulemaking with some kind of discipline.
The fourth North American leaders summit in New Orleans in
20085 introduced an agreement on phytosanitary regulatory
cooperation and progress on a mutual assistance framework for

63.

OECD

AND
FOR REGULATORY
QUALITY
GUIDING
PRINCIPLES
PERFORMANCE (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/regreform/
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See, e.g., North American Leaders' Summit, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://

georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/naleaders/
Dec. 27, 2012).

332

(last

visited

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL - VOLUME 37 - ISSUE 2 - 2012
Restoring Respect for the Law in Canada-US Commerce

emergencies and natural disasters."6 The agreement allowed relief
personnel (from doctors to utility line workers) to receive temporary
permission to work with recognition of professional credentials in
response to situations such as Hurricane Katrina, which had
devastated New Orleans.'6 In addition, an "Initial Workplan" was
issued under the Montebello RCF that was intended to advance the
principles of the framework into the regulatory practices and
procedures of the three governments."
President Barack Obama attended the fifth summit of North
American leaders in Guadalajara, Mexico in August 2009.69 At that
meeting, the SPP and its working groups were officially terminated in
favor of a new, streamlined ten point agenda. 0 One of the items on
the Guadalajara summit agenda endorsed by the leaders was
regulation. President Obama, President Calder6n, and Prime Minister
Harper called for continued trilateral action toward reduction of
"unnecessary regulatory differences"" and "instructed . . . respective
ministers to continue this work by building on previous efforts,
developing focused priorities, and a specific timeline."n2
Despite the leaders' 2009 Guadalajara commitment to continue
regulatory cooperation negotiations, the momentum from the SPP
working groups dissipated with the groups themselves, and the
disestablishment of the SPP was also accompanied by the dissolution
of the NACC. 8 The governments of Canada and Mexico each engaged
the Obama Administration on a bilateral basis on specific priorities,
returning to the dual-bilateral approach to North American diplomacy

66.

Agreement Between the Government of the United States of American
and the Government of Canada on Emergency Management
Cooperation, U.S.-Can., Dec. 12, 2008, available at http://www.state
.gov/documents/organization/142916.pdf.
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See id.
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vwapj/RCF-Work-Plan.pdf/$file/RCF-Work-Plan.pdf.
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See id at 10-11, 21-22.
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American Leaders (Aug. 10, 2009) (on file with author), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/joint-statement-northamerican-leaders.
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See id.
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that had typified the Clinton Administration (after NAFTA
ratification) and the George W. Bush Administration (prior to the
SPP). The economic recession in 2010 only further undermined
trilateral progress on regulatory cooperation.
The Obama Administration, however, dedicated considerable
effort to domestic regulatory reform in 2010, tasking Cass Sunstein
with the development of a regulatory reform plan that led to
Executive Order 13563.74 President Obama's strong statements on
regulation and the economic recovery in his State of the Union
address in 2011 further evidence the importance of reform.75
REGULATORY COOPERATION IN THE OBAMA ERA

The new effort in the United States at domestic regulatory reform
quickly translated into two parallel bilateral negotiations on
regulatory cooperation with Canada and Mexico. Prime Minister
Harper met President Obama on February 4, 2011, and the two
issued a joint statement on regulatory cooperation that established
the United States-Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council ("RCC")
that would work alongside a United States-Canada Beyond the
Border Working Group."
It should be noted that Mexico was more proactive in engaging
the United States on regulatory cooperation than Canada was
following the Guadalajara summit. In May 2010, Mexican President
Felipe Calder6n put regulatory cooperation on the agenda of a
bilateral meeting with President Obama, and the leaders agreed in
principle to establish the United States-Mexico High Level Regulatory
Cooperation Council ("HLRCC")." This was followed in March 2011
by the issuance of specific terms of reference for the HLRCC, just a
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See President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, supra note
37.
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COUNCIL (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
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few weeks after the similar initiative was first announced with
Canada.
In December 2011, the United States and Canada issued a joint
action plan for the RCC." The joint action plan focused the initial
activity of the RCC on five areas: (1) Agriculture and Food (with
priority for addressing the regulation of food safety, agricultural
production, and marketing);80 (2) Transportation (with priority for
addressing the regulation of road and rail systems, marine, and other
transportation issues);, (3) Health and Personal Care Products as
well as Workplace Chemicals;" (4) Environmental regulation;' and,
(5) two Cross-Sectoral Issues (regulations affecting small business and
regulation of the emerging field of nanotechnology)." An initial
agenda of twenty-nine regulatory issues was identified as "low
hanging fruit" to be picked by fifteen task-specific RCC working
groups that draw in regulators from the appropriate agencies of the
American and Canadian governments."
There are several specific deadlines in the RCC action plan to
keep the plan moving forward." There is, however, no specific budget
for this initiative, and regulators must carve out time to participate
from their extant schedules and budgets. Stakeholder input is to be
solicited as needed and prior to any final decisions, in the interest of
transparency. 7 In addition, the various governments and the public
have received updates from the RCC thus far. 8
It is too soon to judge the results of the RCC, and so this paper
will conclude with some thoughts on the challenges the governments
will face in pursuing this initiative in the coming years.
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CHALLENGES AHEAD

Competitive Regulatory Reforms

The Obama Administration has launched several simultaneous
regulatory reform initiatives with limited staffing and funding, and no
clear indication of the relationship among them. These initiatives
include domestic regulatory reform, the RCC, and the HLRCC, but
also the Transatlantic Economic Council Regulatory Cooperation
Initiative," and the Trans Pacific Partnership ("TPP").90 There has
generally been a beneficial relationship between domestic regulatory
reform efforts in the United States and international cooperation in
the past, and indeed the former may be considered a sine quae non for
the latter. In the specific cases of the HLRCC and the RCC, absent
the Obama Administration's domestic efforts at regulatory reform, it
is unclear whether any bilateral engagement would have occurred
following the Guadalajara summit in 2009.
It may be that Mexico's proactive approach to regulatory
cooperation with the United States following the Guadalajara summit,
building on the progress made by the "Prosperity" working groups of
the SPP initiative, helped to spur Canada to pursue a similar
regulatory cooperation dialogue with the United States; anecdotally,
the evidence suggests that Canada was more interested in border
security cooperation in 2010 and 2011." If so, the competition
between Canada and Mexico could be complementary to domestic
efforts in the United States at regulatory reform, and could sustain
momentum in this direction.
However, competing regulatory reform/cooperation processes
domestically and internationally could also permit reluctant regulators
in the United States to stall changes to their current practices and
procedures, accepting only foreign concessions to accept American
standards and harmonization with unreformed American regulatory
practices. A further complication is the launch of the TPP
negotiations, which include regulatory harmonization." The United
89.

See, e.g., Press Release, EU-U.S. Transatlantic Economic Council, Joint
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States is currently negotiating under the TPP with Australia, Brunei,
Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and
Vietnam; at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ("APEC")
summit in Honolulu in 2011, the United States convinced the others
to issue an invitation to Canada, Mexico, and Japan to join the
talks." With this new participation in the TPP, this proliferation of
parallel dialogues could slow the RCC process down or diminish its
capacity to deliver results.
Role of Congress

Several committees of the United States Congress have been
briefed on the RCC to date, and it is likely that congressional interest
and engagement in the RCC will be triggered by specific proposals to
change American regulatory practices.
The United States Government has several overlapping regulatory
agencies, and many businesses and commercial activities are subject
to regulation by several different parts of the federal government (not
to mention state governments).9 This overlap-a key target for
elimination by regulatory reformers in the United States since at least
the Ford Administration-is due in part to the Congress itself, which
has by statute granted such regulatory authority and thereby ensured
that particular congressional committees (and their members) have a
role in oversight and regulation of the economic activities important
to their constituents.'' Streamline domestic regulation, and you may
eliminate a congressional committee of jurisdiction; yet, be prepared
for a congressional response.
This is not a criticism of the involved governments at this stage;
they have kept the legislatures apprised to the extent possible at this
early stage in the RCC negotiations. However, it is not clear that
Congress is as of yet successfully engaged or supportive of this
process. As Adler warns, Congress has its own ambitions for
regulatory reform that are not encompassed in the RCC model."6
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United States 2012 elections
To the extent that the 2012 federal elections in the United States
might yield a change in administration or control of the House of
Representatives or the Senate, the RCC process could become stalled.
As the RCC eventually emerged to pick up the agenda of the SPP
working groups on prosperity in a manner consistent with the
Montebello RCF, there is reason to hope that, after some delay, the
work of the RCC will continue (albeit under a new name or process).
The broader trend towards addressing regulatory differences as an
obstacle to market access and international trade, as well as national
and regional economic competitiveness for business activity and
investment, will ensure that the agenda will not disappear. However,
the RCC was established late and will face institutional resistance
within both the American and Canadian Governments from front line
regulators; it can be expected that the prospect of a change in
political leadership in 2012 will be used to forestall change in the
coming year, and perhaps thereafter.
Berry picking? Low-hanging fruit forever?
The domestic efforts at regulatory reform in the United States
have been high-level, serious, and limited in their results. However,
they have gradually raised the issue of regulation as a drag on the
economy with the general public. Policy journals, academic studies,
campaign rallies and blogs reflect frustration with the regulatory
status quo that has gradually made regulatory reform a bipartisan
American priority.
Yet, regulatory cooperation with trading partners is not seen in
the same light: many groups worry about the "race to the bottom"
that will follow if regulations are changed to remove barriers to
foreign products. The modest ambitions of international efforts at
regulatory disciplines, such as the OECD Guidelines, and the RCC
and HLRCC agendas, reflect this ambivalence, which is not solely
American.
The RCC is still picking low-hanging fruit, as prior efforts have
done. That is worthy work, but modest ambitions lead to modest
expectations and, generally, to modest results.
Just as the key to international success in tariff barrier reduction
was premised on domestic processes in many countries that reduced
the importance of tariffs for national revenue and promoted economic
development and competition behind gradually reduced tariff
protections, the key to international efforts to discipline regulatory
barriers to trade must be a domestic commitment on the part of
governments to reform their regulatory processes and rules. This has
begun to be manifest in Canada, Mexico, and even the United States.
It may be that the RCC is a worthy effort that may only serve as
a milestone on a long road toward progress on regulatory cooperation.
The key, it seems, is the progress of domestic commitment in the
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United States to regulatory reform; to the extent that this matures,
the RCC and successor initiatives will make gains. To the extent that
it does not, we ought not fault the RCC particularly.
RESTORING RESPECT FOR THE

LAW

The challenge of regulatory reform begins domestically, and is
confounded and promoted by domestic political considerations. At the
same time, domestic regulations have come under increasing scrutiny
and criticism as barriers to trade, and accordingly, have found a place
on the international agenda.
Conflicting regulations that are impossible to comply with in good
faith have been the fodder for jokes-recall the "Catch 22" of Joseph
Heller's story in the United States Army in World War II. As
Churchill advises, such jokes and anecdotes accumulate to reduce the
respect for the law among voters.
This has lead to a movement for domestic regulatory reform in
the United States and elsewhere that has made irnportant but limited
progress. In an atmosphere of severe fiscal resource constraints, there
will be growing pressure for public sector productivity gains in the
United States and in Europe, at least. Domestic regulatory reform
should contribute momentum to international efforts at regulatory
cooperation like the RCC. The RCC, however, may be only a marker
on the road to reform.
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